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Legal Education Reform in China
Through U.S.-Inspired Transplants
Matthew S. Erie
Editors’ Note: With publication of “Legal Education Reform in China
Through U.S.-Inspired Transplants,” the Journal of Legal Education is launching
a series of articles exploring historical developments and contemporary trends
in transnational legal education. The Editors welcome submissions touching
on curriculum, pedagogy, and related topics in law schools from all regions of
the world.
Introduction
Over the past several decades, a salvo of development agencies, donors,
NGOs, educational programs, law schools, and academics, many from the
U.S., have sought to reform the Chinese legal system and, particularly, legal
education. At the same time, education ministries of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), increasingly mindful of the status of Chinese education in
a global market, have adapted aspects of the U.S. legal education model in
China. While these exchanges have done much to improve understanding
across the Pacific, there is a lack of assessment to measure their progress. In
this Article, I examine the viability of the U.S. law school model for legal
education reform in the PRC, its implications for China’s legal modernization,
and the experiences of Chinese law students, the would-be catalysts of the
“rule of law” (ROL), through a case study of Tsinghua University Law School
(TULS). At the outset, I note that my study is focused on TULS, where such
reforms are occurring at the margin; however, given Tsinghua University’s
nearly unrivaled prestige in Chinese education, they are influential. Thus,
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TULS occupies the progressive end of the spectrum of Chinese law schools,
and other law schools regard TULS as such.1
I examine two dimensions of the reform of legal education. The first is the
introduction of the Juris Master (JM) professional degree influenced by the
model of the U.S. Juris Doctor (JD). Over a decade ago, the PRC Ministry
of Justice (MOJ) introduced the JM degree to gradually become the main
professional degree for the study of law. As opposed to the top-down creation
of the JM program, the second dimension of reform is changing pedagogies
introduced “bottom-up” by individual law instructors and professors. The
goal of the JM degree is to produce practice-oriented legal professionals
and the objective of the experimental pedagogies is to develop, specifically,
critical and analytical thinking skills as a central criterion for lawyering. I use
an ethnographic approach to study these legal transplants as my status as
U.S. law student, a TULS foreign LLM student, and anthropologist created
a series of contingent positions: insider-looking-out and outsider-looking-in.
Throughout, the perspective I take is of the students’ experience.
My case study of TULS sounds a note of caution in the race to transplant2
exogenous legal institutions, such as law schools, in China. Domestic and
foreign reformers of Chinese law view a modern legal education system as
a prerequisite to ROL. However, ROL means different things to domestic
and foreign reformers. The current ROL modernization project, an uneasy
amalgamation of internal and external pressures, differs from the “law and
development” (L&D) movement of the 1960s and 1970s.3 Rather than uni1.

Further notes as to time-frame of study and terms discussed herein: First, Western countries
have sought to reform legal education in China since the late Qing dynasty. See Weifang He,
China’s Legal Profession: The Nascence and Growing Pains of a Professionalized Legal
Class, 19 Colum. J. Asian L. 138, 142 (2005) (stating that the role played by missionary
schools and universities founded by the West cannot be overstated). The U.S. influence
also started during this period but has intensified beginning in the early 1990s. See infra text
following note 81. I focus on U.S., as opposed to European influence, for reasons both
empirical and ethnographic: not only are American lawyers the majority of reformers at my
field site but my experience as a U.S. law student affords me with a basis of comparison in
considering U.S-influenced legal education reform in the PRC. Second, although U.S. law
schools have undergone their own (limited) transformation in the past 125 years (see infra note
6), by the U.S. model of law schools and legal education, I mean the three-year professional
program (Juris Doctor) designed to socialize legal novices into legal practitioners through
classes and coursework that inculcate legal reasoning and case-based and statutory analysis.
Third, ROL is a highly contested and slippery concept the contents of which differ according
to one’s position whether positivist, normative or ideological. While most would agree
ROL’s definition, at minimum, is a meaningful restraint on state action, for the purposes of
this Article, I emphasize that the U.S. and PRC definitions differ in important ways. The
Article, in part, attempts to illuminate the contours of overlap and divergence through legal
education which the leaders of Chinese legal reform view as leading to ROL.

2.

See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 21 (University of
Georgia Press, Athens, 1993); See also William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The
Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 489 (1995).

3.

The L&D movement featured U.S. legal experts, judges, and academics traveling to
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directional “legal imperialism,”4 A central premise of this Article is that
legal education reform in China proceeds by the “pull” of domestic actors
more than the “push” of external reformers. While PRC legal elites are the
architects of legal education reform, state-led and centrally-planned reforms
that speciously replicate the U.S. model have had unforeseen consequences.
On the other hand, grassroots reforms led by “cultural brokers” appear more
amenable to professionalizing law students.
Section I of this Article introduces the case study of TULS and
methodologies employed. Section II describes the operation of the JM
program and experimental teaching approaches at TULS. Section III
develops the implications of the case study for U.S.-inspired legal transplants
in China. Section IV draws conclusions, makes suggestions, and offers some
provocations for future collaboration between domestic and foreign legal
reformers in the PRC.
An Ethnography of a PRC Law School
While enrolled as a foreign LLM student at TULS from 2007 to 2008, I
examined the impacts of American influence at an elite Chinese law school. I
collected data at TULS’s main campus in Beijing and the branch campus in
Shenzhen.5 The specific reforms I consider here are the introduction of the JM
degree program, patterned after the American JD, and pedagogies that foster
critical thinking skills.6 These two aspects of reform exemplify horizontal and
developing states in Latin America and Africa to reform legal institutions, chief among them,
law schools, to produce a new class of public interest lawyers who would protect human
rights and uphold democratic values. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in
Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the
United States, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 1062 (1974) (offering the definitive critique of L&D and, in so
doing, becoming the most often cited of any article in the literature). As many scholars have
drawn parallels between the L&D movement and today’s ROL initiative (see infra note 79),
and the lasting legacy of L&D as that of a failed movement, this Article, in the spirit of the
Chinese saying “to know the road ahead, ask those coming back,” compares legal education
reform, for the aim of building ROL, to yesteryear’s L&D movement.
4.

James A. Gardner, Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America
(The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1980).

5.

The LLM program in which I was enrolled is distinct from the LLM program for the Chinese
students. TULS offers a master’s degree in Chinese law for international students. Tsinghua
University, The Master of Law Program (L.L.M. Program) in Chinese Law: An Overview,
http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/docsn/fxy/english/llm/llmoverview.htm (last visited May 22,
2009).

6.

In assessing the viability of the U.S. experience for China, I am not claiming that U.S.
law schools themselves are unchanging. U.S. law schools have changed both in terms
of curriculum and pedagogy. They have integrated legal writing and research into the
curriculum and clinical legal education since the 1960s. However, with these exceptions,
which themselves are still viewed as “soft” subjects, U.S. law schools, as an institution, have
remained remarkably consistent for the past 125 years. See e.g., Todd D. Rakoff & Martha
Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 597 (2007). On the topic of
clinical legal education, one of the most controversial aspects of the transplantation of
American pedagogies in China, see Michael William Dowdle, Preserving Indigenous
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vertical legal transplants.7 Although both demonstrate the same horizontality
as they originate in the U.S. tradition, they are different in their vertical
orientation. Whereas the JM program is administered in a top-down manner,
under the MOJ, the experiments in pedagogy are conducted in an ad hoc
fashion by law school deans and law professors. At the same time, the two are
inter-related in that part of the mandate of the JM is to introduce practiceoriented teaching, although the new pedagogies have also been used to teach
graduate students in other programs such as the LLM and undergraduates.
My data gathering focused on (1) the learning strategies of students, (2)
teaching approaches of professors, (3) student reflections on legal instruction,
and (4) how their learning prepares them for their professional careers.
Throughout, I sought to understand the learning experience as a student
myself at TULS while linking classroom learning to the larger context—the
place of students and lawyers in Chinese society. I used an ethnographic
approach developed by anthropologists of legal and political institutions
supplemented by a questionnaire given to students. In this section, I first
describe the institution of TULS and its graduate law degree programs. I then
introduce my methodologies. Next, I provide a profile of the student groups
being compared. Lastly, I assess the two dimensions of legal education reform
in China.
Institutional Setting
TULS is, in many ways, an atypical law school in China for its relatively
young history, its small size, the degree of its internationalization, and its
orientation toward preparing its graduates for high-level positions as decisionmakers and lawmakers. Tsinghua University has always had a close relationship
to the U.S. The university was founded on April 29, 1911, with part of the
Boxer Indemnity, funded by the U.S. government, as Tsinghua Xuetang, full
name Qinghua LiuMei Yubei Xuexiao (Tsinghua Preparatory School for Study in
the U.S.).8 Tsinghua University is most well-known as a multidisciplinary
polytechnic university with an emphasis on training engineers, and particularly,
the “fourth generation” of China’s current leadership including Hu Jintao,
PRC President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
Paradigms in an Age of Globalization: Pragmatic Strategies for the Development of Clinical
Legal Aid in China, 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. S56 (2000) (arguing that international efforts to
promote clinical legal aid in China have impeded the development of indigenous legal aid
practices and institutions). But see Pamela N. Phan, Clinical Legal Education in China: In
Pursuit of a Culture of Law and a Mission of Social Justice, 8 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J.
117 (2005) (arguing that the American model of clinical legal education can play a significant
role in the development of Chinese legal education).
7.

Randall Peerenboom conceives of transplants as having two dimensions—horizontality
and verticality—where each orientation describes the direction of transplantation. See
Randall Peerenboom, What Have We Learned about Law and Development? Describing,
Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 823 (2006).

8.

See Tsinghua University, History of Tsinghua University, http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/eng/
about/history.htm (last visited May 22, 2009).
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(CCP). The law school traces its roots to 1920 when the first law department
was established at the university. In 1995, TULS was re-established as a standalone law school to “answer the call for establishing and enhancing the rule of
law in China.”9
TULS is seen as one of the pioneering law schools in China today because
of its experimentation with curriculum, teaching, and overseas connections.10
The law school offers the four-year LLB, dual bachelor degree of at least four
years, two-year LLM, three-year JM and four-year Ph.D. degree in law.11 It has
53 full-time professors of whom approximately half have obtained an advanced
degree abroad (U.S., Japan, Europe or U.K.) and a total current enrollment of
1,350 students, 306 of whom are undergraduates, making it one of the smaller
law schools in China.12 Further, it has engaged in a range of cooperative and
exchange programs with law schools from the U.S., U.K., and Europe. The
U.S. exchange program for which it is most well-known is the LLM program
in U.S. law taught by Temple University’s Beasley School of Law, a program
supported by a range of private and public donors including the U.S. State
Department.13 Thus, TULS has strong ties to both the PRC government and
the international community and, as such, provides fertile ground for the
study of the cross-pollination of legal education reforms.14
9.

See Tsinghua University, Introduction: Tsinghua University Law School, http://www.
tsinghua.edu.cn/docsn/fxy/english/About.htm (last visited June 3, 2009).

10.

Both Tsinghua University and TULS enjoy remarkable prestige in China. Over the past five
years, since first studying Chinese at Tsinghua University, I have traveled throughout China.
When my Chinese interlocutors hear I study at Tsinghua, whether in Shanghai or Ürümqi,
Kunming or Haerbin, the near universal response is “Zhongguo mingpai daxue!” (China’s
“brand-name” university). In today’s China, where higher education is seen as essential for
upward mobility, Tsinghua carries a kind of talismanic authority, much of it produced by
the Party-state whose “fourth generation” leaders nearly all attended Tsinghua. See Cheng
Li, China’s Leaders 15 (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD., 2001). The only other school
rivaling Tsinghua for national prestige is, of course, Peking University, 1.5 km away. As for
the ranking of TULS, a popular ranking among Chinese students is that of Wu Shulian,
Head of the Study Group, Evaluating Chinese Universities, which puts TULS in the top
5. See e.g., 2009nian Zhongguo daxue faxue Adeng xuexiao [2009 A Class Chinese Law
Schools], http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2008-12-24/1729180847.shtml (last visited May
22, 2009).

11.

Much of the information on TULS that follows was obtained from internal TULS
administration documents on file with the author.

12.

By comparison, East China University of Political Science and Law accepts roughly 2,500
incoming students per year.

13.

The Beasely School of Law has had a long history in China following Deng Xiaping’s visit
in 1979. See Anon., Deng Xiaoping Fuzongli jieshou Meiguo Danpu’er Daxue mingyu
falü boshi xuewei [Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping Receives an Honorary Doctorate in Law
Degree from the U.S.’s Temple University], People’s Daily, February 2, 1979.

14.

TULS is conscious of its modeling after American law schools. Faculty told me TULS
is modeled after Yale Law School. Multiple copies of The Spirit of Yale, translated into
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Writing In/On Law Schools: Methodologies
The study of Chinese legal education has historically relied on quantitative
approaches.15 This preference is tied to the number-orientation of central
ministries that evaluate law schools and determine which schools are awarded
additional programs and resources. Scholars often rely on the official statistical
yearbooks which have their own limitations. Most importantly, statistical
surveys that stress quantitative indicators have at least two shortcomings.
One, they equate increase with progress and such statistics can become part
of the problem in creating incentives that emphasize quantity over quality.
Second, they create blind spots in the experiential aspects of learning (e.g., the
different kinds and sources of pressures students face) that can be addressed
by more participatory approaches.
More recently, scholars have introduced more qualitative methods to the
study of PRC law schools.16 Over the past decade, ethnographies have gained a
foothold in the classroom, elucidating particular aspects of classroom learning
in late reform China17 with American law professors and students contributing
first-hand accounts of their classroom experiences.18
At TULS, I was enrolled in the LLM program for foreign students.
However, as the classes for foreign students are in English and separate from
those of Chinese students, I also audited courses with the Chinese students. I
audited both LLM courses and JM courses. Occasionally, the professor would
single me out as the “foreign expert” and ask me to expound, before the class,
on the differences between PRC and U.S. property law, for example, making
me experience not a small degree of the discomfort of the observer being
observed. Additionally, I took every chance to participate in student activities
from formal events such as the 2008 TULS Doctoral Student Conference in
Chinese, on the bookshelf of one teacher corroborated this point.
15.

See Sharon K. Hom, Beyond “Stuffing the Goose”: The Challenge of Modernization
and Reform for Law and Legal Education in the People’s Republic of China, in Chinese
Education: Problems, Policies, and Prospects 287, 291-92 (Irving Epstein ed., Garland Press,
New York, 1991).

16.

See, e.g., Dowdle, supra note 6 and Phan, supra note 6.

17.

See, e.g., Kai-Ming Cheng, Understanding Basic Education Policies in China: An
Ethnographic Approach, in The Ethnographic Eye: Interpretive Studies of Education
in China 29 (Heidi A. Ross, Judith Liu & Donald P. Kelly eds., Routledge, New York,
2000); Michael Agelasto, Educational Disengagement: Undermining Academic Quality at
a Chinese University (1998); Vanessa Fong, Only Hope: Coming of Age Under China’s
One-Child Policy (Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 2006).

18.

See, e.g., Sharon K. Hom, American Legal Education Methodology in China: Teaching
Notes and Resources (Prospect Publishing House, Beijing, 1990) (providing a description
of attempts to introduce various American legal teaching methodologies in Chinese law
school classrooms while developing an intensive one-year teacher training program at China
University of Politics and Law); Kara Abramson, Paradigms in the Cultivation of China’s
Future Legal Elite: A Case Study of Legal Education in Western China, 7 Asian-Pac. L.
& Pol’y J. 302 (2006) (describing her experience as a lecturer at Sichuan University Law
School).
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nearby Hebei Province to student union-sponsored events on studying abroad
in the U.S. My underlying goal was to (re)learn the study of law aside my
Chinese classmates.
I employed semi-structured interviews with both LLM and JM students as
well as four groups of legal academics and practitioners to gain a better idea
of how these groups view master’s degree law students, their training, and
preparation for a career in lawyering. To understand the goals and rationale
of teaching approaches, at TULS, I conducted interviews with professors,
clinical legal education and legal aid instructors, administrators and the then
dean, Wang Chenguang. The second group I interviewed was American
and European visiting law professors at TULS to determine, from their
comparative perspective, the differences in teaching Chinese law students as
opposed to those of their home country. Third, I interviewed American law
professors teaching at other law schools in Beijing to assess American-style
teaching at other law schools. Last, I interviewed partners at both foreign and
Chinese law firms to evaluate the job market for LLM and JM students. In all,
I conducted 38 interviews.19
I supplemented my ethnology and interview with a focused questionnaire
designed to elicit responses to specific issues for which I wanted feedback from
the class as a whole. Although Chinese students are generally not familiar
with completing surveys, the TULS administration was encouraging.20 Each
class has a banzhang (class monitor) who liaisons between students, faculty,
and administration. The administration had me work with the banzhang to
administer the questionnaires. I distributed and collected the questionnaires
during individual classes.21
Profiles of Comparison Groups
For my study, I sought to compare the two main graduate degrees in law
in the PRC: the LLM, which is a traditional civil law graduate degree, and
the JD-inspired JM. As such, I collected data from first year students in both
programs during the 2007-2008 academic year. Sixty-five of the seventy-nine
LLM students in the class of 2009 (who began their studies in the fall semester
of 2007) responded, which comprises 82 percent of the class (n1=65). Ninety
percent of the LLM students fell within the category of age twenty-one to
twenty-five while only 8.3 percent were older. Female and male students were
about evenly represented. The students were nearly all Han Chinese mostly
from the eastern provinces and provincial-level cities.
For the JM class of 2010, which also began classes in the fall of 2007, 193
of the 253 students or 76.2 percent responded to the questionnaire (n2=193).
19.

All names of Chinese students are pseudonyms.

20.

But cf. Kai-Ming Cheng, supra note 17, at 33 (explaining the differences between Chinese and
non-Chinese notions of “research” in the field of education).

21.

But cf. Abramson, supra note 18, at 305-06 (describing her survey which was blocked by the
administration of the Sichuan University Law School).
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As a whole, the JM students were slightly older than their LLM counterparts:
76 percent were between twenty-one to twenty-five years old and 19.8 percent
were twenty-six to thirty. Male students were more prevalent at 59.1 percent of
the class. JMs were also almost exclusively Han Chinese and came from the
more developed, eastern provinces.
Legal Education Reform from Above and Below
Assessing the JM Program: Top-Down Reform
The JM program at TULS illustrates problems endemic to the professional
degree in law. Many of these problems are an effect of central planning misfire:
the consequences of trying to introduce top-down, piece-meal reform into an
existing legal education system. The result is a program that has the superficial
features of the JD (i.e., three years in duration, enrolling students with no
previous law training, training in legal practice, etc.) but which, in practice,
exhibits conventional Chinese civil law education. I compare JM students
with LLM students to show how TULS has designed its degree programs to
favor the latter over the former.
Background to the JM Professional Degree Program
The JM degree program has been fundamental to the modernization of
Chinese legal education. In 1993, a research team consisting of legal education
experts, jointly organized under the Ministry of Education (MOE) and MOJ,
was convened to improve legal education. As part of this process, research
was conducted on the American JD program.22 In 1995, the Academic Degree
Committee of the State Council approved the Juris Master (falü shuoshi)
Professional Degree Program.23 A pilot program was launched a year later
at eight universities; 539 students have now graduated from this program.24
The National Steering Committee of the Juris Master Professional Degree
Education was formed in 1998, under the Academic Degree Commission and
the MOE and MOJ, but it is ultimately accountable to the MOJ,25 chaired
initially by Xiao Yang, then head of the MOJ and President of the Supreme
People’s Court, to oversee the implementation of the JM.26 In 2003, 37,000
22.

See Xiandan Huo, JM jiaoyu: yifazhiguo de rencaiku—Zhongguo falü shuoshi zhuanye
xuewei (JM) jiaoyu de tansuo yu gaige [JM Education: The Brain Bank for Ruling the
Country According to Law—Probing and Exploring China’s Juris Master Professional
Degree (JM) Education], 7 Zhongguo Lüshi 58, 59 (2002).

23.

See Weidong Ji, Legal Education in China: A Great Leap Forward of Professionalism, 39
Kobe U. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2006).

24.

See id.

25.

The JM is, in fact, the only law degree administered under the MOJ. All other degrees
are under the MOE. The result has been a kind of inter-ministerial turf war in setting the
curriculum, teaching methods, and overall goals of the degree programs.

26.

See Xianyi Zeng, Legal Education in China, 43 S. Tex. L. Rev. 707, 711-12 (2002). In 1999,
the National Steering Committee established the curriculum for the JM degree. See Falü
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people took the entrance exam for this program and by 2004, it surpassed the
MBA to become the top entrance exam for graduate studies.27 From 1996 to
2006, 18,102 students earned JM degrees.28
There are currently JM programs at 80 universities, with some 30,000
students enrolled, and the number of universities offering JM degrees is
projected to grow to 100 by 2010.29 It is the goal of the MOJ and most educators
to transform the study of PRC law from the model of an undergraduate major
in a comprehensive university to a post-graduate professional school with the
JM being the main law track in China.30
The JM degree has been interpreted widely by Chinese academics as
essential to the modernization of China’s legal system and as a requirement to
building ROL. Scholars have viewed it as vital to realizing former President
Jiang Zemin’s yifazhiguo “rule the county according to law”31 and preparing
lawyers to compete for legal services in post-accession WTO China.32 The
overriding purpose of the JM is to produce better legal practitioners. The JM
is part of an overall shift in the strategy of state legal education from theory
to practice or from “legal article, legal principle, legal philosophy” (fatiao, fali,
fazhexue) to “legal article, legal principle, legal practice” (fatiao, fali, fashijian).33
shuoshi zhuanye xueli yanjiusheng zhidaoxing peiyang fang’an [Program and Guidelines
for the Training of JM Professional Degree Graduate Students], promulgated by the State
Council Academic Degree Committee, amended 2006, available at http://www.fashuo365.
com/html/2006-10/3598.html.
27.

See Xiangshun Ding, J.M. haishi J.D.? Zhong, Ri, Mei fuhe xing falü rencai peiyang zhidu
bijiaox [J.M. or J.D.? A Comparison of Chinese, Japanese and American Composite Models
of Legal Personnel Training], 3 Falüjia 137, 138 (2008).

28.

See id.

29.

See Xiandan Huo, Zhongguo falü shuoshi zhuanye xuwei jiaoyu zhidu de shijian yu fansi
[The Practice and Rethinking of China’s Juris Master Professional Degree Education
System], 5 Hebeisheng Zhengfa Guanli Ganbu Xueyuan Xuebao 24, 28 (2008).

30.

Id. at 26.

31.

See Zhu Liheng, Lun falü shuoshi zhuanye xuewei jiaoyu de xianzhuang yu gaige, [On the
Present Conditions and Reform of the Juris Master Professional Degree ], 26 Hebei Faxue
159 (2008) (quoting Zhang Fusen, head of the Second National Steering Committee of the
Juris Master Professional Degree Education).

32.

See Anon., Schools Aim to Help Law Experts Compete, Zhongguo Jiaoyu he Keyan
Jisuanjiwang [China Education and Research Network] (2002), available at http://www.
edu.cn/200201_1478/20060323/t20060323_22506.shtml (quoting Huo Xiandan, Deputy
Director-General of the Ministry of Education’s Legislation and Legal Education
Department, who provides guidelines to law schools and law departments in the PRC).

33.

See Yongan Liao, et al., Luoshi falü shuoshi shiwu xing rencai peiyang mubiao zhi wo jian:
“falü shuoshi zhuanye xuewei yanjiusheng peiyang fang’an yu kecheng tixi gaige” ketizu,
[Opinions on Ascertaining the Goals of the Juris Master Model of Practical Affairs and
Personnel Training: Study Group on “The Reform of the Training Program and Curriculum
System of the Juris Master Professional Degree Graduate Students”], 30 J. Xiangtan Normal
U. (Social Science Edition) 119, 119 (2008).
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Learning Environments
One of the most profound differences between LLM and JM students
at TULS is their learning environment. Whereas all LLM students study at
TULS’s main campus in Beijing, since the introduction of the JM program in
2000, most JM students have studied at the Shenzhen branch campus. TULS
in Beijing is located on the campus of Tsinghua University, one of China’s
largest universities, containing 31,000 students including undergraduates
and graduates. TULS is adjacent to the Tsinghua University Science Park, a
major R&D center, which houses the main offices of Internet giants Google,
Microsoft, Baidu and Sohu. Tsinghua University is located in Haidian District
in Beijing where China’s other top universities are located. As such, TULS’s
Mingli building on the main campus features a constant flow of students and
scholars from throughout the country and the entire world.
TULS moved the base of the JM program to the Shenzhen Graduate School
in 2004, a campus of relative luxury. The center of campus has the feel of a
Pacific island resort, replete with lush tropical foliage and flowers, reflecting
pools, winding canal, tennis courts, and is adjacent to one of Shenzhen’s
most exclusive golf courses. It features the Shenzhen Science and Technology
Library, in the form of a dragon spanning the man-made canal, touted as “the
first public and national library” in the country which has a capacity for 1.5
million print volumes. But the library’s bookstore has no books and the coffee
shop has no coffee.
The Shenzhen Graduate School, which the law students share with students
in the other schools, is a beautiful physical achievement, but it is not a vibrant
intellectual climate. The JM program runs on a four-term academic calendar.
Unlike the LLM program, there is no full-time faculty in residence at the
TULS branch campus at the Shenzhen Graduate School. Rather, professors
from the main campus spend approximately two months to teach two courses
in Shenzhen and then rotate out. Some faculty members expressed their
reluctance to travel to Shenzhen to teach the JMs. Furthermore, there are few
extracurricular activities, few student organizations and clubs, no international
students, and no guest lecturers or speakers. There are around 5,544 full-time
graduate students at the Shenzhen Graduate School,34 but unlike the busy rush
of TULS’s main campus, Shenzhen Graduate School, with a total capacity
for approximately 16,500 students, feels empty.35 Further, Shenzhen Graduate
School is isolated from the city with, as yet, no affordable mass transportation
for students. As one JM student confided, the “hard environment” (yinghuanjing)
is very good but the “soft environment” (ruanhuanjing) is lacking.36 The JM
34.

See University Town of Shenzhen, Brief Introduction to University Town of Shenzhen,
http://www.utsz.edu.cn/Catalog_72.aspx (last visited May 22, 2009). Note that Shenzhen
Graduate School administrators, in an interview May 24, 2008, put the number at 4,373.

35.

This number is calculated from the area built for student dormitories. There is 660,000 sq.
m. of dormitory space for students and the minimum space for three graduate students (the
average number of roommates) is 12 sq. m.

36.

Shenzhen University Graduate School also has branch campuses for Peking University Law
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students were nearly unanimous in wanting to relocate to Beijing;37 some halfjoked they were “sent down to the countryside” (xiaxiangle). However, TULS
has an economic incentive to keep students in Shenzhen. The Shenzhen
municipal government gives 20,000 RMB for each law student it brings to the
Shenzhen Graduate School. In sum, while the Shenzhen Graduate School is
impressive in its infrastructure, it seems the LLM students benefit most from
the academic environment of TULS.
CLASSROOM EXPERIENCE: LEARNING THE CURRICULUM

The JM program, as opposed to the LLM, which aims at training academics,
was intended to train “practicing attorneys” (shiwu falüren).38 The classroom
offers one view into the merits of the program in accomplishing its intended
goal. The classroom experience, too, offers perhaps the sharpest contrast
between the LLM and JM programs. The contrast shows that not only is the
transplantation of the JD as the JM in China one that is hollowed out of its
defining characteristics, but that the university has continued to lay emphasis
on the existing LLM degree program.
Neither the LLM nor the JM classrooms have the same kind of intensity
and culture of competition that is the hallmark, for better or worse, of the JD
classroom. This characteristic of the Chinese law classroom is the product of
traditional classroom ethics, enrollment, and teaching styles. The LLM classes
were mainly small or medium-sized seminars of no more than thirty students,
organized around their area of specialization.39 In these seminars, students
would take turns making presentations often with PowerPoint (PPT). The
student presenter would take questions from the professor and sometimes
School, Nankai University, and Harbin Institute of Technology. Each of the universities
has tried different ways to maintain a sizeable student body at Shenzhen Graduate School.
Peking University Law School brought its JM students back to its main campus at the end
of the 2007 academic year. That year, the School of Transnational Law (STL) under Peking
University took its place. STL has its roots in the foundation of the U.S.-China Joint Center
for Study of Law and Policy in 2005 when U.S. Supreme Court Justice Kennedy partnered
with Peking University and the Beijing Foreign Languages University. The idea was to
develop a three-year JD program for Chinese law students that would teach transnational
law using American teaching approaches. While the PRC Academic Degree Committee
of the State Council approved STL in a record two months, STL must wait to apply for
ABA accreditation. STL began classes in the fall of 2007 with 55 students. While the longterm impact of STL remains to be seen, most immediately, it will add to the intellectual
community of Shenzhen Graduate School.
37.

Of the JM students I interviewed, only one, Gao Zhihui, from Gansu Province, said he
preferred Shenzhen’s University City, saying, “here we have mountains and we have rivers.
Beijing has only crowds and pollution.”

38.

See Yongan Liao et al., supra note 33, at 1.

39.

The LLM class was divided into two classes (banji) which were, in turn, sub-divided into
many specializations. Class 071 had 39 people sub-divided into the following specializations:
commercial law (28), economic law (11), and environmental law (3). Class 072 had 40
people organized as follows: international law (16), criminal law (6), jurisprudence (7),
constitutional law and administrative law (6) and procedural law (5).
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the students followed by discussion. Students did not seem concerned with
hierarchy in these oral participations; to the contrary, due to their familiarity
with each other, there was a much more collaborative atmosphere to their
learning (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. How competitive was your class?
While the LLM classroom reflects the stated goal of the degree program—
to train students in a specialization, largely for an academic degree, the JM
classroom does not seem to meet the stated goal. JM instruction exemplifies
the mainstream teaching approach known as “stuffing the duck” (tianya
jiaoxue), consisting of lecture and which encourages memorization of statutes
for examination.40 JM students were organized into large lecture halls of
sometimes over 175 students.41 The professor lectures with the aid of PPT,
sometimes reading entire portions of statutes, and there is infrequent student
participation and almost no interaction. Very rarely are hypotheticals used or
any sort of application of principles learned. For instance, in a contract law
40.

See Hom, supra note 15.

41.

Mandatory courses for the JM degree include: Deng Xiaoping Thought, foreign language,
jurisprudence, general introduction to civil law, general introduction to criminal law,
criminal procedure law, civil procedure law, administrative law and administrative procedure
law, economic law, international law, commercial law, and constitutional law. Electives range
from Chinese legal history to tax law to property law and maritime law. The course “legal
practice” that teaches practical skills such as interviewing, drafting, and research is an
elective course.
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course, to explain contract modification, the professor used a case example
of a publishing house suing an author for breach of a modified provision of
the contract. The professor went through the plaintiff’s claims, the damages
sought, and then read the judgment. He did not review the court’s reasoning,
ask questions, or use subsequent hypotheticals to test students’ understanding
(see Figure 2).

Figure 2. What teaching methods do your professors use?
Moreover, many students whisper among themselves during lectures,
send text messages on their cell phones, or sleep. Students often skip class
and, instead, attend cram schools in Shenzhen to prepare for the bar exam.42
Professors rationalize that like undergraduates, JM students do not have a
background in the law and thus the professor must give them the fundamentals.
However, in treating the JMs like undergraduates, professors are foreclosing
the very aim of the program—to produce legal professionals.43
42.

Alternatively, students will listen to free recordings of cram school classes on-line. Students
emphasize a disjuncture between their classes and their bar preparation, but often their
criticism is that the latter focuses merely on memorization and does not require the thinking
skills that they can develop through their degree program.

43.

Wang Chenguang, former Dean of TULS, has written of many of the shortcomings of the
JM. See Chenguang Wang, The Rapid but Unbalanced Growth of China’s Legal Education
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THE STUDENTS

There is a prejudice against JM students in legal education and the job
market. They are viewed as second rate by teachers, law school deans, and
prospective employers.44 Some of the difference of opinion as to the quality of
JM versus LLM students derives from the ways in which they are recruited. To
make the JM professional degree the primary route for legal professionals, the
MOJ has sought to increase the number of incoming students.
Students can enter the JM program in one of two ways: through either taking
the entrance examination (yanjiu ruxue kaoshi) or by baosong (recommendation).
The entrance examination tests a variety of subjects including students’
knowledge of the substantive law. In order to pass this exam, students often
study four or more months at a cram school (peixun xiaoxue). The baosong system
was started in the reform period to improve the recruitment of students. All
100 universities designated as members of “Project 211,” a designation by
the MOE beginning in the early 1990s, have the baosong system. Tsinghua
University began using the baosong system in the late 1990s, and the law school
began using it in 2003 for undergraduates and in 2004 for the JM and LLM
students. The baosong system is designed to encourage students to study certain
majors by allowing them to enter the degree program without having to take
the entrance exam. Rather, they are chosen based on their past grades and an
interview.
The baosong system exemplifies this process of expanding JM classes
sometimes at the expense of quality. In the JM class of 2010, 100 students
were given offers. Their evaluation was based on their undergraduate grades,
their major, and a five-minute interview. The interview is typically before
four to five teachers who each asked one question in English or Chinese.45
This process, according to the students, was just a formality. Once given an
offer, students then accept or deny. After the admissions committee learns the
total number of baosong students, it then extends offers to test-takers to fill the
additional slots. LLM students are also admitted through baosong, but there
are differences.46 Significantly fewer students are admitted by baosong; only
Programs, Spring (vol.) Harv. China Rev. 1 (2006) (identifying the JM program’s failings
as: 1) inability to attract top students; 2) mode of entrance via a substantive examination
that tests students on law who have never studied law; 3) lack of new teaching materials;
4) a pedagogy that does not lead to professionalization; and 5) graduates cannot find good
jobs).
44.

See Xiangshun Ding, supra note 27, at 142.

45.

A typical English question was “explain your name in English.”

46.

In addition to the differences in the baosong system, LLM and JM applicants also take
different entrance exams. The former take the zizhu mingti (school-based written exam)
generated by TULS that either tests all areas of law or just the legal specialization to which
the applicant is applying. The latter take the quanguo timu (nation-wide exam). The
difference between the Chinese recruitment system, consisting of both baosong and exams,
differs greatly from the U.S. system which puts heavy emphasis on the nation-wide Law
School Aptitude Test (LSAT).
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twenty-nine in the class of 2009. Moreover, the interview is like an oral test
(koushi) that examines the applicant’s knowledge of all areas of law, not just
the specialized area to which the student is applying. It lasts about twenty
minutes and the student applicant must actively debate with the five professor
interviewers. Additionally, TULS recruits from Tsinghua undergraduates
much more heavily for the LLM than for the JM class.
The admissions process reinforces Tsinghua University’s status among
students as a “brand-name university” (mingpai daxue). In some cases, pressure
to earn a TULS degree outweighs the students’ interest in studying law.47 This
motive applies nearly equally to both JM and LLM students, however (see
Figure 3).

Figure 3. Why did you choose TULS?

47.

This preference is not unique to the study of law. The pressure to attend a top university
is so great that students will ignore the subjects for which they have a passion if studying
a less interesting major will afford them a spot at a top university. This phenomenon also
partly explains wenpingre (diploma-seeking fever) by which students successively pursue
academic degree programs to advance their socio-economic status. See Fong, supra note 17, at
89-90.
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The legal profession in China more often looks down on the JM students
than the LLM students for this propensity. That perception, not unlike the
way Japanese lawyers and judges regard students graduating from Americanstyle law schools in their country, is bolstered by professional elitism and
protectionism. A Chinese associate at a top international law firm in Beijing,
who earned an LLM at TULS, explained, “we [LLMs] are the best. The JMs
did not get a good enough score initially on their [university entrance] exam to
study law and they are given a second chance.”48 International law firms show a
preference, in hiring first year associates, for students who obtained an LLB at
the undergraduate level and then either went on to obtain an LLM in China or
abroad.49 Domestic firms also prefer LLM graduates. The newest trend is for
Chinese students, with a LLM or even with only a LLB, to obtain a JD in the
US.50 One partner at a leading Chinese firm reported that the LLB degree is
required for joining all practice groups except for intellectual property. Thus,
JMs are only hired for a specialized practice such as intellectual property if
they have an undergraduate background in the sciences.
FINANCING A LEGAL EDUCATION

Unlike their JM counterparts, LLM students stay in Beijing for the
duration of their degree program. One would assume that the tuition costs
for the degree programs would reflect the difference in living standard in the
two respective locations, and the cost of tuition for the JM program would be
less than that for the LLM. However, the opposite is true.51 Just as the LLM
tuition is cheaper than that for the JM, so, too, are there more options for
tuition repayment for LLM students. As part of the restructuring of higher
education in the late reform period, students are now more reliant on private
sources of funding for tuition repayment.52 Nevertheless, LLM students get
48.

As with the university entrance exam, the graduate school entrance exam score determines
both the quality of graduate program and the major itself. Many students will attend cram
schools to increase their chances of acceptance.

49.

Obtaining an LLM abroad, preferably from the U.S., is an unspoken rule for advancement
in most international law firms. This rule partly stems from internal policies of the law firms
and from restrictions on international law firms in China. For the regulations that place
restrictions on the activities of international law firms in the PRC, see Waiguo lüshi shiwusuo
zhuhua diabiao jigou guanli tiaoli [Regulation on Foreign Law Firms’ Representative
Offices in China], promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 22, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002,
arts. 15 and 16.

50.

See Carole Silver, David Van Zandt & Nicole De Bruin, Globalization and the Business of
Law: Lessons for Legal Education, 28 Nw. J. of Int’l L. & Bus. 399 (2008) (observing an
increase in JD-holding Chinese lawyers primarily because of PRC regulations preventing
locally-licensed lawyers from practicing local law in association with foreign law firms).

51.

For the JM program, years 1 and 2 (in Shenzhen) are RMB 16,000 and the third (in Beijing)
is RMB 10,000. The LLM students, in contrast, pay RMB 10,000 for the two or three years
of their program.

52.

A decade ago, the government was still providing full tuition assistance (gongfei), but as
part of the reforms, the government provides only partial tuition assistance. Further, most
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more support from TULS in the form of scholarships than JM students.53
More than 80 percent of JM students rely on parental support to pay their
tuition,54 whereas LLM students finance their education with a combination
of parental support, loans, and scholarships. JM students were mindful of the
difference in tuition between their program and their LLM counterparts in
Beijing and resented it.
Experimentation with Critical Thinking Pedagogies: Bottom-Up Reform
Beginning in the late 1990s, law schools introduced experimental pedagogies
that foster critical and analytical thinking skills (pipanxing siwei). These
approaches include the Langdellian case method and Socratic teaching style,
well-established in U.S. law school teaching. These methods cut across degree
programs whether LLB, LLM or JM. Although pedagogical experimentation
is part of the larger objective of the JM program to produce more practiceoriented law students, in practice, LLM students may benefit more from these
pedagogies than JM students. Differing approaches may explain that while
some proponents of introducing experimental teaching methods in PRC law
schools are U.S. professors, most are Chinese law professors or deans who have
studied abroad in the U.S.55 These educators bring with them a conviction
that the U.S. common law style of instruction is vital to instilling critical
reasoning in students, that is, to “thinking like a lawyer.” Thus, as opposed
to the L&D movement where the agents of reform were primarily foreign, in
the experiments in pedagogy in China today, Chinese instructors are adapting
American methods to the Chinese classroom. In the L&D movement,
the case method was seen as the pedagogy of choice to inculcate a greater
instrumentalist perspective on the law with the goal being to push students
to link doctrinal arguments with the underlying philosophical principles and
policy objectives.56 Its use in China today has produced mixed outcomes.
Some Chinese law professors mimic American law professors in teaching the
Socratic Method, believing it the best approach. Others adapt the Socratic
Method in a much more nuanced fashion.
Critical Reasoning in the Classroom
Teachers at TULS have, for several years, been experimenting with critical
reasoning teaching approaches, largely borrowed from the U.S., that hold
universities base financial assistance on entrance examination scores, which precludes
assistance to baosong students.
53.

The LLM students are offered scholarships based upon their first semester grades. Although
the scholarship usually does not cover the cost of tuition in full, it can.

54.

When JM students enter the program, they sign a zichou peiyang jingfei shuoshi yanjiusheng
xieyishu (Written Statement of Agreement for Independently Raising the Expenses
Required for Pursuing the Master of Arts Program) which precludes TULS from providing
for most forms of financial aid.

55.

See, e.g., Zeng Xianyi, supra note 26, at 715.

56.

See Gardner, supra note 4, at 249-51.
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greater promise for professionalizing students. Many Chinese educators spent
time in the U.S. either as graduate students or visiting professors and serve as
“culture brokers”57 who possess both transnational symbolic capital58 as well
as “local knowledge.”59 However, their effectiveness in adapting U.S. teaching
approaches to China depends on a number of factors including the duration
the Chinese educator spent abroad and the extent of his or her exposure to
and involvement in U.S. law teaching.
Many of these educators overlook the importance of critical reasoning and
focus exclusively on test preparation (yingshi jiaoyu). Reform-minded educators
have sought to modify American-style teaching methods that emphasize
critical reasoning skills. For purposes of exposition, critical reasoning can
take two forms: what could be called “thin” and “thick” conceptions of critical
reasoning. “Thin” critical reasoning applies to the exercise of analytical
reasoning as applied to legal materials to further the client’s interests. It has
close affinities with formal logic. This is the critical reasoning tested in the
LSAT: analyzing and evaluating argumentative statements. In law school,
students acquire thin critical reasoning through questioning and argumentative
exchange during which professors lead students to look for points of similarity
or divergence in sets of “facts” that either support or undermine the staking of a
legal claim based on precedent.60 Thin critical reasoning informs many aspects
of lawyering: conducting research including reading cases and statutes as well
as examining evidence; developing (multiple and alternative) case theories;
drafting memos or contracts; and oral advocacy and client consultation.
“Thick” critical reasoning widens the purview of analysis by focusing
not only on policy analysis per se, but further, on politics and institutions
of authority more generally, whether governmental, corporate, religious,
or ideological. This form of critical thinking is not an explicit objective of
57.

See Irwin Press, Ambiguity and Innovation: Implications for the Genesis of the Culture
Broker, 71 Am. Anthropologist 205 (1969) (viewing the culture broker or “marginal man” as
having a mandate, in the Parsonian sense, to innovate).

58.

A growing number of social scientists are considering the role of agency in the form of
transnational actors in the structures of globalizing processes. See, e.g., Hilary Cunningham,
The Ethnography of Transnational Social Activism: Understanding the Global as Local
Practice, 26 Am. Ethnologist 583 (1999) (analyzing the development of transnational
identities among political activists); Beth Baker-Cristales, Magical Pursuits: Legitimacy
and Representation in a Transnational Political Field, 110 Am. Anthropologist 349 (2008)
(examining the strategies of Salvadoran state actors to contain and control transnational
political subjects in the postwar period); Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural
Logics of Transnationality (Duke University Press, Durham, 1999) (assessing the
entrepreneurial, multiple passport-holding Hong Konger as an agent of transnationalism).

59.

See Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Facts and Law in Comparative Perspective, in Local
Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 167 (Clifford Geertz ed., Basic
Books, New York, 1991).

60.

See William M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of
Law (Summary) 5-6 (2007), available at http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/dynamic/
publications/elibrary_pdf_632.pdf.
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instruction in formal educational institutions such as a law school; more likely,
it is acquired from repeated exposure to and immersion in diverse forms of
cultural media outside the walls of the school. Thick critical reasoning forms
the basis for political mobilization whether democratic, such as Kagan’s
“adversarial legalism,”61 or socialist, as in classical Marxist thought.62
For today’s legal missionaries in China, thick critical reasoning, particularly
that which works toward the ends of western liberalism, is the Trojan horse
in the professionalization of the country’s lawyers.63 In this view, China’s
young lawyers are equipped with the resources to challenge the authority of
the Party-state and work as agents of promoting a rights-based society and
even democratization. For most Chinese educators, however, thick critical
reasoning and its subversive agency are less a priority than is improving thin
critical reasoning. Or, thick critical reasoning takes on a different valence than
the American tradition with its bristling adversarialism.64
Yet critical thinking is not something Chinese students are taught until they
reach law school as undergraduates or graduate students. Instead, learning
proceeds by memorizing materials and imitating the teacher in preparation
for examination for the purpose of acquiring substantive knowledge rather
than thinking creatively.65 Efforts to introduce critical thinking at the primary
or secondary education levels by culture brokers, in this case, either Chinese
61.

See Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 9 (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 2001) (defining the concept as a method of dispute resolution
with two salient characteristics: 1) formal legal contestation and 2) litigant activism).

62.

See Karl Marx, Capital, Volume One, in The Marx-Engels Reader 294, 320 (Robert C. Tucker
ed., W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1978) (observing, famously, that in the commodity,
a product of labor, men’s labor appears as a social relation not between themselves but
between the products of their labor).

63.

See Matthew Stephenson, A Trojan Horse in China? in Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad
191 (Thomas Carothers ed., Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Washington, DC, 2006). See also
Eric Henry, Speaking English in Shenyang: Language and the Cosmopolitan Imagination
in China (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with author)
(providing a parallel example, from the perspective of English language acquisition, whereby
native English speakers believed their teaching English would bring with it Western values,
morals, and iconoclastic individualism).

64.

It is received knowledge that this is a learned behavior derived from the socialization
process of law school. When I was pursuing my LLM at TULS, after one class, a woman
from Switzerland commented that the American students were exceptional to the extent
that they challenged the professor. After studying in a U.S. law school for three years and
comparing my interactions there with those at TULS, it seems the American classroom
grooms its students to be assertive, outspoken, and argumentative. The cauldron of the U.S.
law school classroom, through the Socratic Method, mock trials, mooting and like exercises,
places a premium on oral confidence in making legal arguments. My conversations with
students from civil law countries outside of China confirm this distinction. This suggests
that Americans are the outlier in this regard. It is not that the Chinese lack this mode of
engagement with the material and those who teach it, but in fact, most countries value less
antagonistic approaches.

65.

See Agelasto, supra note 17, at 353.
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or American, are often met with resistance by the school administration.66 At
the same time, Chinese law students do learn critical thinking based on the
continental civil law tradition. A JM student named Wang Bocai, who planned,
after graduation, to attend law school in the U.S., compared American and
Chinese critical thinking this way:
After studying the American LSAT, I understand critical reasoning in U.S.
law schools to divide legal arguments into evidence, assumptions, and
conclusion. Any one of these can be wrong or inaccurate which weakens the
legal argument. In critical reasoning, as it is taught in Chinese law, we are not
taught to think like this. In our approach, analysis proceeds by: one, stating
the definition and then, two, elaborating a beautiful system (wanmei tixi), but
we are not taught to look for flaws.

Wang Bocai’s depiction highlights the difference between common law
deductive and analogical reasoning versus civil law inductive reasoning.
Students begin with the legal definition or theory (one level of abstraction) and
then, from there, develop a scientific structure (a second-order abstraction).
Principles are taken out of their factual and historical context and facts
recede.67 One American law professor teaching U.S. common law at TULS
noted that her Chinese law students were not used to the “grinding down” of
case material into factual distinctions which JDs are taught relentlessly their
first year. Stéphanie Balme, a visiting law professor from France, said that her
Chinese students’ logic was impressive in the formal (i.e., thin) sense but they
had much more difficulty attempting what she calls “vivid (legal) reasoning”
by which they “question or criticize—even in a constructive way—people who
hold more power than themselves.”68
These comments suggest that civil law instruction takes place within
defined social relationships between student and teacher, which are politicized
in the PRC. Both JM and LLM students told me that most professors prefer
questions to be asked one-on-one after class. In these conversations, ideas of
respect (zunjing) or “saving face” (ai mianzi) were recurring. Students repeatedly
analogized respect for the professor to respect for the judge, law firm partner,
or other authority figures. These hierarchical relationships determine the
extent of “free speech” inside and outside of the classroom and the “thickness”
of critical thought.
Since the June 4, 1989 “Democracy Movement,” which began as a student
protest, the government has taken measures to co-opt students, seen as
66.

Id. See also Huhua Ouyang, One-Way Ticket: A Story of an Innovative Teacher in Mainland
China, 31 Anthropology & Educ. Q. 397 (2000) (providing an account by a Chinese English
teacher who tried to introduce more communicative pedagogies from the West into her
classroom but faced stiff opposition from established teachers).

67.

See John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems
of Western Europe and Latin America 64 (Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1985).

68.

Interview with Stéphanie Balme, a visiting law professor from France, in Beijing (Mar. 25,
2009).
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among the most liberal elements of society, into its state-led modernization
project.69 Such measures include introducing patriotic education as early as
primary school and increasing the prevalence of CCP organs in universities.70
Most law schools have CCP branches with both the faculty and the student
body. Further, student bodies have active membership in the Communist
Youth League of China (Youth League). At Tsinghua University, each class
has two or three presidents: a class president, a Youth League president, and
sometimes a CCP president. Student representatives of the Youth League or
CCP are responsible less for monitoring speech and imposing sanctions for
errant views than they are in “thought development” (siwei peiyang) through
student meetings as recitations of CCP doctrine. Similarly, the faculty of
TULS has a CCP branch whose primary activity is to organize meetings to
ensure that CCP policy is disseminated to CCP members within the faculty.
The CCP branch and the university administration (i.e., law school faculty)
are seen as separate and distinct. However, CCP branches in universities have
power to introduce curriculum from higher-level CCP authority, although
the exercise of this power is seen as interference with the independence of
teaching. Likewise, reporting on students’ speech is seen as undue interference
although this does not mean that it does not happen.71
Thus, for a variety of reasons—pedagogical, cultural, and political—students
are wary of their speech. While in private conversation, they express their views
of law and policy freely and say they could make such statements during class,
when they are actually in class, they exercise a form of guarded self-censorship.
When they do exercise thick critical thinking, students often use proxies. For
instance, they might take U.S. law and American culture as the object of their
critique, such as an LLM Modern Western Philosophy course during which
students poked holes in the U.S. constitutional concept of “police power,”
although the conversation steered clear of discussing China. In other courses,
students discussed the divergence between statutory law and law in practice in
the areas of Chinese contract or administrative law to demonstrate how judges
and lawyers veer from correct legal doctrine. Although professors occasionally
used a case to highlight the problem of local corruption and even elicit strong
69.

See Elizabeth J. Perry, Casting a Chinese “Democracy” Movement: The Roles of Students,
Workers, and Entrepreneurs, in Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China:
Learning from 1989 74 (Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., Westview Press,
Boulder, 1994) (providing explanations for the movement’s genesis and failure).

70.

See generally Suisheng Zhao, A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in
Post-Tiananmen China, 31 Communist & Post-Communist Stud. 287 (1998).

71.

In practice, the Party-state has erected multiple layers of surveillance between its organs
within the faculty and the students. For instance, students occasionally do monitor other
students’ views and even those of professors. See, e.g., David Bandurski, Chinese Students
Inform on Political Science Professor, China Media Project, (November 27, 2008), http://
cmp.hku.hk/2008/11/27/1407/ (reporting on the case of Professor Yang Shiqun at the East
China University of Politics and Law whose students had gone to the public security bureau
to report that content in Professor’s Yang’s class was anti-government which has led to a
formal investigation).
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responses from students,72 such occasions were the exception and narrowly
tailored such that there were few wider discussions as to the government’s or
the CCP’s role in affecting legal outcomes where their interests are at stake.
In all classes, the overall trend was for the professor to set the parameters of
discussion and the bar for critical statements.
Students who exercise critical thinking outside of class are often subject
to surveillance by state security bureaus. For example, in 2004, I witnessed a
public protest on the main quad of Tsinghua University when the university
shut down the students’ electronic bulletin board system after politically
sensitive comments were posted. In vivid contrast to the style of student
protests in the U.S. during the Iraq War, the Tsinghua students’ protest had
the feeling of a wake. The students bowed their heads silently before the
central sundial on which the expression is carved: xingshengyuyan “actions speak
louder than words”. A plainclothes public security officer, so identified by a
Chinese friend after the incident, recorded the students with a camcorder.
By associating critical thinking in the law classroom with political
liberalization and mass movements, foreign legal reformers often make
erroneous assumptions about the role of lawyers in Chinese society and their
capacity to effect political change. Significantly, of all the groups with whom
I interacted during my fieldwork, including American and European law
professors, Chinese law professors, and Chinese administrators, the group
most pessimistic about the potential of lawyering to bring about social change
in China was the TULS students themselves.73 Only 39.8 percent of JMs and
51.7 percent of LLMs thought lawyers can influence public policy. When asked
whether lawyers can push reform, fewer than half of JMs and LLMs (39.1
percent and 45 percent, respectively) said they “basically agree.”
The law students’ views of the status of lawyers in Chinese society are
closely linked to their motives for attending law school and their ultimate
career plans. Students were unabashedly pragmatic in their reasons for
studying law at TULS and their future plans. While the name recognition
of Tsinghua University galvanized much of their decision-making, the law
career itself offers few benefits (see Figure 4). Consequently, most students
I talked to do not plan to become lawyers. Their primary reason was that
lawyering is difficult work with few rewards in terms of income or prestige,
unlike the stratospheric salaries and elite lifestyles that await many American
law students at comparable, elite law schools. They regard competition for
72.

One example was a choice of law issue during a civil procedure JM class. The statute
provided for the law of the defendant’s jurisdiction to be controlling but the loan agreement
between the parties provided for the law of the plaintiff’s jurisdiction to prevail. Because the
borrower in the case was a state-owned bank, local legislators, under pressure by the local
government, issued special provisions to validate the claim of the borrower.

73.

This finding accords with the growing law and society literature on Chinese lawyers. See,
e.g., Ethan Michelson, The Practice of Law as an Obstacle to Justice, 40 Law & Soc’y Rev. 2
(2006) (concluding that “cause lawyers” function as gate-keepers to keep many grievances
out of the courts).
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entry-level positions in domestic law firms as too intense and even harsher
for international law firms. Instead, most TULS students wanted to become
civil servants (gongwuyuan) (see Figure 5). Although the income is not as high
as partners in established law firms, civil servants have much more security
and a more collaborative and relaxed (qingsong) work life. Many viewed TULS
as more helpful in making social connections with classmates who would
later assume high positions in the government and the CCP than in terms
of acquiring professional legal skills. As opposed to the career of an official,
lawyers just starting their careers must depend on themselves, which is too
risky. Those students who were public interest-minded, explained a male LLM
student named Guo Richang, thought that rather than be seen as an agent
outside of and working against the government (as a lawyer),74 a much more
promising route was to work for the government.

Figure 4. Reason for attending law school

74.

Students were acutely aware of the difficulties of lawyering in the public interest in China
whether as legal aid attorneys, public defenders or working for an NGO.
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Figure 5. Career choice
The preference of TULS law students to become civil servants over lawyers
has implications for the teaching of law and, specifically, the potential for
critical reasoning pedagogies. The Trojan Horse theory would posit that even
if law school graduates pursue careers as officials, they will still use the critical
reasoning skills they acquired in law school to promote the liberalization
of society, because, as officials, they are acting within the government.
Unfortunately, the experience of TULS students demonstrates this theory
may be wide of the mark. Students see the law-route and the official-route as
two very distinct careers. The two career trajectories begin with their different
qualifying exams, the national judicial examination (guojia sifa kaoshi) and the
national civil servant examination (guojia gongwuyuan kaoshi), respectively, which
test different material and different skills. More importantly, the two careers
have different reward systems for promotion and advancement. While lawyers
advance through handling of cases and development of clients, both of which
actively call upon critical reasoning skills, civil servants rise through their
vertical organizations largely by following orders and appeasing superiors in
an approach colloquially known as pigu jueding naodai (“your ass directs your
brain”).
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A LAW TEACHER AMONG WOULD-BE OFFICIALS

Despite the propensity of TULS students for joining the government,
TULS is nevertheless one of the most dynamic Chinese law schools in terms of
pedagogical experimentation for critical reasoning skills. As law schools have
more discretion in structuring curriculum for graduate than undergraduate
programs, professors at TULS have been able to introduce innovative courses
designed to bolster analytical, critical, and creative reasoning among the
law students. These adaptive pedagogies differ starkly from top-down legal
education reforms. Whereas in planning the JM, considerable research was
conducted on the U.S. experience, the design and subsequent administration
of the professional degree program were handicapped by a lack of experiential
knowledge of the JD and a distanced view of the students. In contrast, some
educators who have benefitted from the different approaches to legal education
in multiple systems and who interact daily with students are designing
much more tailored approaches to legal instruction. Professor Betty Ho’s
program “Foundations in Common Law” (Foundations) is one such example.
Originally from southern China, Professor Ho (Chinese name: He Meihuan)
has spent most of her career as a practicing attorney and law professor outside
of China. She studied common law in Canada, the U.K. and U.S. She joined
the TULS faculty in 2002 and taught full-time through 2008. She brings her
experience in both the Anglo-American and civil law systems to her teaching.
While she acknowledges globalization as Americanization, she seeks to frame
U.S. teaching approaches within the Chinese system through indigenization
(bentuhua) and critical evaluation.75
Professor Ho organized her Foundations course as a four-semester program:
Foundation I teaches students how to read cases, Foundations II teaches case
analysis, Foundations III teaches legislation, and Foundations IV consists
of a moot court. The content of the course is Anglo-American common law.
Both she and her students speak in English. She limits the class to about
twenty students and requires each to take a written entrance exam. Third‑ or
fourth‑year undergraduates can take the course, but it is mainly LLMs. JMs
can only attend if they are studying at Beijing. I observed her Foundations II
course.76
Foundations balances U.S. teaching methods with understanding of the
learning styles, experiences and expectations of Chinese law students. In the
first class, Professor Ho organized the students into groups of four who read,
analyzed, and presented cases. She divided class time between a full session
with all twenty students, small group discussions of draft reports assessing
a line of cases, and presentations during which an assigned group would
present cases and another group would critique the first group’s analysis and
75.

See He Meihuan, Lun dangdai zhongguo de putong falü jiaoyu [Discussing China’s Modern
Common Law Education], (China University of Politics and Law, Beijing, 2005) (calling
globalization “quanqiu falü Meiguohua” (global legal Americanization)).

76.

Professor Ho did not allow auditors for her course. To my knowledge, I am the only auditor
she permitted to observe her course in the six years she taught it.
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reasoning. During the full class session, the groups would present cases in a
manner analogous to how professors in the U.S. go over cases in class (i.e.,
parties, facts, case history, issues, reasoning, and holding). Professor Ho
elicited students’ responses as to the analysis of the case and then entered
them on blank PPT slides. She employed a “soft” Socratic approach to test
each group’s understanding of the case. Progress made through the case
material was heavily fact-specific and much time was used making sure the
group “on call” brought out the nuances of the fact pattern. While a group
would know if it was “on call” and so those students had some forewarning,
she would call freely on members of that group. While the general spirit of
the full class session was one of collegiality, the pressure and intensity felt in
U.S. law classrooms was palpable before class as students rushed to prepare or
review materials and talked nervously among themselves.
Overall, the students exhibited little difficulty or discomfort in adapting
to their first common law experience. The multiple challenges of studying
a significant amount of foreign case material in a second language, through
novel teaching approaches and under palpable pressure, had some noticeable
but not inhibitory effect on their classroom performance. There were traces of
civil law reasoning in some of their presentations. For example, students would
focus more on individual cases and the proposition(s) they stood for rather
than the relationships between them. Also, during the group presentations, the
students would generate PPTs that would graphically illustrate the “structure”
of a judge’s reasoning with a systematicity that would seem perhaps extraneous
to U.S. law students.
Survey results showed students saw multiple benefits.77 For Foundations
II, these can be grouped as 1) ability to analyze cases and legal arguments,
2) ability to discern logical defects, 3) ability to comment on and criticize the
reasoning of others, and 4) the ability to work in teams. Students’ appraisals of
the work they did in the course further suggested “thicker” critical reasoning
skills. One female LLM student said she learned “bravery to challenge the
judge, to analyze the judgment and its reasoning, and to learn how precedents
have been used for different purposes.” But, there were drawbacks to the
program, attrition being the largest problem; very few students completed
Foundations IV, citing the volume of the work and the unaccustomed pressure.
Students in Foundations II spent 3.6 hours per day preparing for class. The
average LLM spent approximately two hours per week preparing for all of
their classes. While the high rate of attrition and the resource intensiveness of
Professor Ho’s program may shed doubt as to whether her approach can be
replicated without further modification, her Foundations sequence out as one
of the more promising examples of refashioning U.S. pedagogies to Chinese
law schools. Professor Ho’s Foundations program is one example of a hybrid
teaching approach that has promise in the reform of Chinese legal education.
LLMs and JMs selected a hybrid approach that combines some lecture and
77.

Surveys were based on questionnaires that Professor Ho collected each year from the period
2002-2008.
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professor instruction to provide a baseline for discussion but then proceeds
by interaction, dialogue, and exchange as their first and second ideal teaching
methods, respectively (see Figure 6).78

Figure 6. Students’ ideal teaching methods
Implications for Legal Education Reform in China
The case study of TULS shows several problems inherent to the use of
transplants in legal education reform and law reform, more generally, in
the PRC. These problems, building on Peerenboom, can be grouped into
the following categories: the horizontality of transplants, the verticality of
transplants, and the globalized context within which transplantation occurs.
These categories provide a basis with which to assess the findings of the TULS
case study and its significance for law school reform in China.
Horizontal Transplants: Between the Push and the Pull
One of the central differences between the exportation of U.S. legal
institutions during the earliest phases of L&D and the contemporary ROL
78.

Forty-one and seven-tenths percent of the JM students preferred the Socratic Method. I
found that because they had such little exposure to the pedagogy, they idealized it to an
extent greater than the LLMs who had some experience learning Socratically.
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initiative is the paramount role, today, of local political elites in steering the
course of reform. Domestic actors including law professors, law school deans,
and other educators are doing much of the heavy lifting in terms of institutional
reform. Nevertheless, legal transplantation occurs as a process with two
forces: promotion by the country of the transplant’s origin and reception by
the adapting legal system. The TULS case study evidences the two roles and
suggests that the viability of a transplant depends on such factors as active
participation and local knowledge.
Scholars have drawn parallels between the L&D movement half a century
ago, and today’s ROL movement, even calling the ROL initiative the “new”
L&D movement,79 particularly given the focus on reforming legal education
in non-western countries. The first wave of the L&D movement did not affect
China as the county was embroiled in the upheavals of the Great Leap Forward
and the Cultural Revolution during the movement’s florescence.
Yet since the early 1990s, a constellation of actors, with overlapping agendas
and mixed goals, have pushed ROL projects in the PRC by funding and
exporting legal expertise for specific instrumental purposes. The genesis of
the U.S. effort can be traced to the Ford Foundation’s funding of the first
U.S.-style legal aid center at Wuhan University in 1992.80 Since then, multiple
players have entered the arena as part of the industry of exporting ROL models
through transplantation. The actors include representatives of all branches
of the U.S. government, including the executive,81 the Supreme Court,82

79.

See, e.g., Carol V. Rose, The ‘New’ Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold War
Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 Law & Soc’y Rev. 93 (1998); Michael J. Trebilcock & Ronald
J. Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development 280 (Edward Elgar Publishing, London,
2008); but see David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, The New Law and Economic Development
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006).

80.

See Benjamin Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law in China, 34 Tex. Int’l L.J. 211,
233 (1999). See also Stephenson, supra note 63, (assessing the fruits of the “China rule of law
initiative” started by President Clinton in 1997 which gave official imprimatur to these
efforts).

81.

Interview with former State Department officer, in Beijing, P.R.C. (Apr. 2, 2008) (stating
that the State Department wanted Chinese law to move to a precedent system by, among
other causes, promoting case method analysis in law schools).

82.

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Kennedy established the Joint Center for China-U.S. Law &
Policy Studies in 2005. It has hosted several conferences on legal education exchange in
both the U.S. and China.
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and Congress;83 the American Bar Association;84 developmental agencies;85
NGOs;86 law firms;87 law schools;88 scholars;89 and commercial outfits.90 U.S.
actors work in concert with members of the PRC legal community including
the MOJ, All China Lawyers Association, legal practitioners and academics.
Law school reform has taken many forms such as those aimed at improving
the training and continued education of Chinese law professors91 and those
directed at educating Chinese law students in U.S. law.92 However, reforms
that focus on the institution of the Chinese law school itself have had the
most widespread impact on Chinese law students. From the U.S. perspective,
the contemporary drive to institute ROL in China concentrates much of its
resources, manpower, and funding on training the next generation of lawyers
via methodologies developed in the U.S. with the intent that these lawyers will
be agents of change toward a more open, rights-based China.93
83.

See, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 108th Congress, The Rule of Law in
China: Lawyers without Law? Roundtable before the Congressional-Executive Commission
on China (Comm. Print 2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:87399.wais (discussing the impact of U.S.-led
efforts to reform P.R.C. law schools).

84.

The American Bar Association’s “Rule of Law Initiative” in China includes a “Legal
Education Reform and Civic Education” project. See ABANet.org, ABA Rule of Law
Initiative: China, http://www.abanet.org/rol/asia/china.html (last visited May 25, 2009).

85.

The Ford Foundation’s Law and Rights Program has been one of the most active donors in
Chinese legal education reform. See, e.g., Weidong Ji, supra note 23, at 13 (discussing the Ford
Foundation’s establishment of clinical legal education programs in Chinese law schools in
September, 2000).

86.

See ChinaDevelopmentBrief.com, Directory of International NGOs, (2007), http://www.
chinadevelopmentbrief.com/dingo/ (last visited May 25, 2009).

87.

See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers LLP, The O’Melveny Scholarship Programs: Shanghai and
Beijing, www.omm.com/aboutus/scholarships/ (last visited May 25, 2009).

88.

Most top U.S. law schools now have exchange programs with Chinese law schools. For a
partial list of summer study programs, see Wei Luo, Summer Study Programs of Chinese
Law in China or Hong Kong, http://law.wustl.edu/Chinalaw/chlsumm.html (last visited
May 25, 2009).

89.

See, e.g., Council for International Exchange of Scholars, Fulbright Scholars Program,
http://www.cies.org/ (last visited May 25, 2009) (sending a handful of U.S. law professors
to Chinese law schools each year).

90.

LexisNexis sponsored a conference entitled “LexisNexis-Peking University Law School
Discussion Forum for the Integration of Sino-American Legal Education and Legal
Practice” on October 28, 2008. Westlaw has recently introduced a product called “Westlaw
China.”

91.

See Anne F. Thurston, The Committee on Legal Education Exchange with China (CLEEC):
1983-1997. pt. 43 (1997) (detailing the workings of the CLEEC during 1983-1997, this report
describes the impact of the program, which financed the overseas education of several
leading Chinese academics, on individual careers, teaching approaches, and “rule of law”).

92.

LLM programs offered at U.S. law schools are increasing in number. See Zhenmin Wang,
Legal Education in Contemporary China, 36 Int’l. Law. 1203, 1207 (2002).

93.

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of St., Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record

Legal Education Reform in China Through U.S.-Inspired Transplants

89

Interviews conducted during the 2007-2008 academic year reveal a spectrum
of responses to this approach. Chinese law students were enthusiastic about
taking a class with a law professor from the U.S. but were also quick to point
out the shortcomings of programs that bring U.S. law professors without China
experience to TULS and other PRC law schools. Students were skeptical of
the impact of visiting scholars who have a light course load and teach for only
one semester.94 Both TULS law students and U.S. law professors teaching at
TULS and elsewhere thought their interaction was, at times, superficial and the
long-term impact minimal. Moreover, many programs fail to provide training
for visiting professors who are told simply to “teach like a U.S. classroom.”
Students were more appreciative of visitors who taught a heavy course load
and stayed for longer than a semester, such as Stéphanie Balme who taught at
TULS for two years. Overall, students were appreciative, however, of visiting
faculties’ efforts regardless of the duration of their teaching. In short, from the
Chinese students’ perspective, the time the visiting professor spent teaching in
China as well as that individual’s “China knowledge” were important.95
Additionally, joint projects between foreign legal experts and Chinese
counterparts are sometimes frustrated by miscommunications about
immediate goals (i.e., difference in expectations between the parties) as well
as long-term ends (e.g., disparate conceptualizations of ROL and the role of
legal institutions in its promotion). One example is the Tsinghua Legal Clinic
Program (TLCP) founded originally in September, 2000, as the “Consumer
Protection Clinic” with the support of the Ford Foundation. Modeled after
U.S. clinical legal education, the clinic was meant to provide students with
opportunities to represent consumer clients in court; however, since many
such disputes are settled through mediation and reconciliation, this objective
was not met. By 2001, the Consumer Protection Clinic was replaced by the
“Labor Protection Clinic” and the “Disadvantaged Group Protection Clinic.”
The Ford Foundation encouraged the TLCP to take on high-profile cases but
many TULS faculty wanted to take on less sensitive cases.96 In 2004, when
2006 84 (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/80699.pdf.
94.

Alison Anderson, an American law professor who taught at TULS, commented: “I
cannot even begin to imagine all the differences in concepts of school, the teacher-student
relationship, career patterns, and so forth all of which impact learning. It would be
presumptuous to try to analyze all this after mere[ly] eight weeks of teaching my students six
hours a week”; Cf. Eli Wald, Notes From Tsinghua: Law and Legal Ethics in Contemporary
China, 23 Conn. J. Int’l L. 369 (2008) (providing a journal of a U.S. law professor teaching
professional ethics in China for the first time at TULS for one quarter or 14 meetings of 120
minutes).

95.

While most programs that bring U.S. law faculty to China teach U.S. law, with some inroads
into international law, Chinese law students nevertheless spoke more highly about foreign
faculty who knew how to communicate non-Chinese legal systems to them. Mandarin
language acquisition, knowledge of Chinese history and law, and sensitivity to Chinese
classroom etiquette were all skills valued by Chinese students.

96.

Misunderstandings in U.S.-Chinese joint projects rarely feature a simple U.S. versus Chinese
difference in opinion. In the case of TLCP, many TULS faculty also pushed high-profile
cases.
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the TLCP accepted more controversial cases, local authorities intervened and
faculty were fired. TLCP was subsequently re-organized and currently operates
in conjunction with two extracurricular programs: the Tsinghua Barefoot
Lawyers’ Training Program (started in 2006) and the Tsinghua Rural Legal Aid
Center (established in 2004). The early difficulties of TLCP can be attributed,
in part, to misdirection in terms of matching certain types of disputes with
appropriate channels for public interest law instruction. More fundamentally,
however, the collaboration was impeded by differences between the function
and ultimate aims of the project; U.S. sponsors viewed clinical legal education
as a vehicle for access to justice while Chinese hosts saw the clinics primarily
as an educational tool for students. Although the TLCP provides a cautionary
tale, it has, over time, established a sustainable program that both instructs
students and provides pro bono legal service to the community.97
Vertical Transplants: Top-Down and Bottom-Up
Perhaps the central implication of my TULS case study is that bottomup, grassroots adaptations of legal transplants are more responsive to local
conditions and needs than grand schemes in the form of state-sponsored
central-planning. This point confirms the theme of William Easterly’s The White
Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little
Good. In this book, long-time expert on foreign aid Easterly describes two ideal
types of foreign aid: the “planner” and the “searcher”:
In foreign aid, Planners announce good intentions but don’t motivate anyone
to carry them out; Searchers find things that work and get some reward.
Planners raise expectations but take no responsibility for meeting them;
Searchers accept responsibility for their actions. Planners determine what to
supply; Searchers find out what is in demand. Planners apply global blueprints;
Searchers adapt to local conditions. Planners at the top lack knowledge of the
bottom; Searchers find out what the reality is at the bottom.98

Although Easterly’s depiction has been criticized for its idealized dichotomy,
his characterization holds true for legal education reform in China. Easterly’s
types apply to (e.g., U.S.) foreign aid workers, but they can be extended equally
to their in-country counterparts. The JM professional degree program began
as a result of a research study headed by PRC legal experts working under
the Academic Degree Commission and in conjunction with central ministries.
The effect of the pilot program was an academic degree program that failed to
integrate the more efficacious aspects of training in the American JD program
with the distinct character of learning in the Chinese classroom. Any fine-grain
details acquired by the planners from actual teaching experience were muted
97.

The program is a four credit course for one semester, requiring three hours of classroom
instruction per week, with space available for a total of 40 students. Criteria for accepting
cases include the nature of the case, instructional value, merits of the case, security
considerations, and venue of the action (only Beijing cases are accepted).

98.

See William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good 5-6 (Penguin Press, New York, 2006).
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out in designing and implementing the JM program as the Chinese equivalent
of the JD. In addition, while the JM program encourages teaching that
facilitates practical training, the program lacks clear guidance or incentives for
teachers to do so.
In contrast, searchers, such as Professor Ho and other educators working
on the ground, have direct and constant interface with students and work to
find practical ways to tie non-Chinese teaching approaches into classroom
dynamics. These educators effect small-scale change based on accumulated
local knowledge and practical experience which allows the teachers to make
necessary adjustments whether curricular or pedagogical depending on
students’ performance and feedback. For example, the small group discussions
of draft reports in Professor Ho’s Foundations program provide a venue for
immediate feedback and teacher-student interaction to the benefit of both the
educator and the learner. Nonetheless, Chinese teachers seeking to introduce
experimental approaches operate within the confines of the university faculty
and administration, state-mandated curriculum, and the surveillance of CCP
organs. Each constraint works, in various ways from budgetary to disciplinary,
to thwart innovation.99
Context for Transplants: Globalization as Americanization
Today’s legal transplants operate under a set of global conditions that differ
significantly from those of fifty years ago during the L&D movement. The
bipolar order of the Cold War has been replaced by American supremacy
that still operates through traditional realist notions of military and economic
power, but also through “soft power”—the role of the U.S. in globalization.
Globalization, as conventionally understood, deterritorializes flows of
capital, technology, commodities, migrants, media, and law. As opposed to
modernization theory of the 1960s, which assumed identifiable categories
of time and space as unilinear and evolutionary, globalization witnesses a
marked acceleration of time-space compression in capitalist political economy
as central to culture change.100 Transplants no longer operate in a one-to-one
trajectory but rather are diffused, often repeatedly (re)localized such that they
successively shed the skin of their origin (e.g., the U.S. JD is borrowed by
Japan and then China borrows the JD based on the Japanese experience101).
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the metaphor of the transplant is obsolete
in the “age of globalization.” When observers speak of globalization, they are
often participating in the celebratory misrecognition of hegemonies that are
identifiable. This is, more exactly, a partial misrecognition as, on the one hand,
Chinese legal reformers’102 valorization of the preeminent legal models of the
99.

See, e.g., Ouyang, supra note 66.

100. See Michael Kearney, The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and
Transnationalism, 24 Ann. Rev. of Anthropology. 547, 551 (1995).
101. See Xiangshun Ding, supra note 27.
102. The Americanization of law schools has been a theme of reform over the past couple of

92

Journal of Legal Education

day has been a conscious endeavor,103 but, on the other hand, the entry of
globalization as a discourse elides the origin of legal models and transplants.
This is not to dismiss globalization as a faux concept, but to suggest that the
globalization of law obscures more than it explains. In academic discussions
about reform of law schools in China, often “the global” stands in for the
U.S.104 This invocation is not only an a priori assumption that the U.S. style
should, in fact, be the world standard, but, more importantly, it partially
misrecognizes the hegemonization of “lex Americana.”105
While the object of critique during the L&D movement was legal
missionaries and the ethnocentric assumptions that undergirded much of their
decades throughout East Asia. See Setsuo Miyazawa, Kay-Wah Chan & Ilhyung Lee, The
Reform of Legal Education in East Asia, 4 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 333 (2008) (providing a
literature review of the Americanization of legal education in China, Japan, and Korea).
103. That is, European during the founding of the Republican China, Soviet when the
Communists took power, and American in the reform era. Much has been written about
China’s borrowing of U.S. commercial law. See, e.g., Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China
Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People’s Republic of China, 20 Yale J.
Int’l L. 273, 274 (1995) (asserting that the National People’s Congress was “plainly modeling
[the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted December 29, 1993, revised
October 27, 2005] on American and other Western corporation codes” although it will
not be expected to produce business entities comparable to those in the U.S.); Jennifer A.
Crane, Riding the Tiger: A Comparison of Intellectual Property Rights in the United States
and the People’s Republic of China, 7 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 95, 97 (2008) (calling PRC
intellectual property laws “an elaborate United States-inspired intellectual property legal
regime without the political and social foundations”); Richard Student, China’s New AntiMonopoly Law: Addressing Foreign Competitors and Commentators, 17 Minn. J. Int’l L.
503 (2008) (comparing China’s first comprehensive antitrust law, the Anti-Monopoly Law,
effective August 1, 2008, to provisions of the U.S.’s Sherman Act of 1890); Xian Chu Zhang,
The Old Problems, the New Law, and the Developing Market—A Preliminary Examination
of the First Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, 33 Int’l Law. 983 (1999)
(finding that the regulatory model affirmed by the Securities Law of the People’s Republic
of China, effective July 1, 1999 is modeled on securities law of United States).
104. For instance, on Dec. 15-16, 2001, law professors and law school deans from throughout East
Asia convened a conference at Renmin University of China School of Law entitled “21st
Century Forum for Reforming and Developing the Legal Education in Asia.” About a third
of the papers addressed problems of globalization but focused on learning from the U.S. or
from East Asian countries that have adopted the U.S. model. The Association of American
Law Schools convened the “Chinese and American Law School Deans’ Conference” from
Mar. 31-Apr. 2, 2005 at the China University of Political Science and Law during which
many PRC law schools expressed their desire to form partnerships with U.S. law schools.
Also, on May 19, 2007, TULS hosted the “Tsinghua-Tokyo University Symposium: Reforms
of Legal Professional Education in Japan and China. Globalization as a Challenge to Legal
Education,” which featured exponents of legal education reform in Japan and China, but the
central problem discussed was how to adapt the U.S.-style of law schools to the respective
countries.
105. See Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana? United States Legal Assistance, American Legal
Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. Pa. J. Int’l
Econ. L. 179, 180 (1999) (describing this movement as “the extraordinarily ambitious and
multifaceted drive undertaken or supported by U.S. organizations and individuals to
transplant laws and legal ideas and to foster legal reform or development abroad”).
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work,106 today, the object is Americanization as globalization itself. Just as the
L&D movement encountered a backlash among “dependency” theorists,107
so, too, in contemporary China, the so-called New Left (Xin Zuopai) critique
China’s integration into the global capitalist system, via such supranational
organizations as the WTO, and supported by legal reforms which evidence
American neoliberal influence, as detrimental to the interests of the country
and, specifically, the commoner. The New Left is comprised of intellectuals,
such as Wang Hui,108 Han Deqiang,109 Cui Zhiyuan,110 Wang Shaoguang,111
and Gan Yang,112 who come from diverse academic fields but who write to
reappraise the concepts of modernity and development and to transcend
inveterate binaries such as socialism and capitalism, modern and traditional,
and China and the West.113 They share a common disdain for policies of
the PRC government, over the past fifteen years, that promote economic
development and embrace globalization at the expense of massive class
stratification. Their platform is partly a return to core tenets of communism,
partly a reinterpretation of Western social democratic theory, partly a
strain of surging nationalism, and part of a more general push-back against
globalization in developing countries and the U.S. role in the unipolar world
order. These scholars have joined with officials that have formed cliques in
certain governmental ministries. Although a minority, they have, in the area of
legal reform, stalled the passage of legislation that was deemed as complaisant
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toward the Washington consensus.114 The New Left shares certain intellectual
affinities with the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement in 1960s America
which wrote against U.S. legal imperialism during the L&D movement and
the role of the institution of the U.S. law school in reproducing hierarchies
abroad and at home.115 There is even collaboration between the first generation
CLS and today’s New Left.116
My conversations with law faculty at TULS and other leading PRC law
schools suggest that while collaboration with U.S. legal experts still confers
considerable prestige to Chinese educators, Chinese faculty and administration
have much more definitive goals than even a decade ago. Progress has resulted
both from the overall development of the field of legal education in China as
well as from American experts consciously tailoring projects to meet the needs
of Chinese colleagues rather than imposing pre-formed projects that fail to
account for local conditions, and differing legal systems and legal cultures.117
A more structural problem, however, is a view that certain legal transplants
are prerequisites of a “modern” legal education system. The work of cultural
brokers with transnational legal knowledge is crucial to not just localizing
such transplants, but, specifically, critically evaluating their adaptation.118 The
JM program is one instance of a mis-identified transplant as a kind of global
marker of legal modernity but is, in fact, a product of one specific legal system
embedded in a tradition of education and political and legal culture that could
not differ more than that of the PRC. Instead of the cut-and-paste approach,
micro-adaptations that take the form of experimentation, trial and error,
hybridization, and continual student feedback, guided by teachers versed in
the multiple legal systems, may form the basis of a more constructive dialogue
for reform.
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Conclusion
United States foreign policy post-9/11 has undermined its status as an
exemplar of ROL. At the same time, critics cite the world financial crisis as
evidence that neoliberal economics no longer offer a sustainable model for
developing nations. No surprise then, that the question lingers as to whether
the U.S. model of legal education is the best path to seed ROL abroad. To be
sure, the process of adapting that model to the economy outpacing all the rest
poses a unique set of problems.
From the perspective of Chinese law students, U.S. legal transplants dressed
up as globalization fail to recognize the particular challenges confronting
Chinese law students in late reform PRC. Chinese law students face pressures,
constraints and decisions that have no analogue in the experience of American
JD students. The socialization of Chinese law students occurs within the
relationship between Chinese political and legal culture and traditions
of education that generate notions of lawyering and its teaching that are
markedly different from American law schools. It is little wonder that TULS
students themselves are opting out of the law career trajectory. The problem
has deeper roots, however, in terms of the lack of rewards, economic incentive,
and stability in the profession of lawyering. Although Tsinghua University
is exceptional for its close ties to the Party-state, students at TULS are not
alone among law students in China in attending law school with a mind to
choose a non-lawyer profession, such as becoming a civil servant. Further, in
direct conflict with many U.S.-led aspirations, students at TULS demonstrate
deep skepticism as to the capacity of lawyers to function as agents of political
liberalization. Views of lawyering will change as the legal market matures, but
governmental regulation of lawyers suggests change is not forthcoming.
The centralized and top-down approach of introducing new law degree
programs, such as the JM, shows that basing such reforms on specious models
of the U.S. experience results in unintended consequences. So while the JM
is being designed as the main degree for professionalizing PRC lawyers, in
fact, the LLM remains a more efficacious vehicle of professionalization. This
is particularly true in terms of developing practical skills of legal reasoning,
argumentation, and oral advocacy. While the JM program is successful as a
revenue-generator for law schools, universities, and local governments, from
the perspective of students, in many respects, the JM program is a failed
transplant. The program demonstrates that transplantation that is imported
based on the U.S. experience is not likely to prepare Chinese law students
for the particular challenges they face. It is doubly ironic that more PRC law
schools are moving to the JM model as the sole graduate law degree.
At the same time, grassroots legal transplants show greater promise for
improving and reforming legal education. Educators who have knowledge
across legal systems, jurisdictions, and cultures are breaking new ground with
approaches to law teaching, rooted in their experience in working with Chinese
students. Such efforts require more attention from scholars and support from
funders. Joint PRC-U.S. training programs for Chinese law instructors should
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seek to cultivate such approaches. But Chinese law instructors should not be
the only objects of improved efforts at legal instruction. While in the past
most training programs and international conferences were convened by
ROL-promoters from the U.S., recently Chinese legal experts have begun
their own practice of instructing lawyers, judges, and law enforcement officials
from other (developing) nations though training programs and international
conferences.
From the perspective of U.S.-sponsored programs in China and other
would-be exporters of legal education to the PRC, greater attention should
be given to training and preparing teachers who go to China. ROL projects
in China today are less a product of an individual Western agency and more
the alchemy of well-intentioned U.S. expertise mixed with Chinese reformers’
goal to accumulate global social capital. Nonetheless, in terms of institution
reform as a whole, China has a history of grounding foreign institutions in
Chinese social practices. China may enter the forefront of legal instruction
if it continues to draw upon best practices—such as the German Übungen or
exercises during which students can apply the principles learned in lectures
to cases in smaller groups; in-class mock transactions during which students
take on different roles as in certain common law countries; and externships
and clinics that are both a product of and responsive toward local conditions.
It may be that China can develop hybrid teaching approaches that improve
on some of the excesses of U.S. law schools and thus reinstate students as the
center of legal education.

